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ABSTRACT 
 Analyzing whether a correlation existed between these two acquisition portfolios, 
we proposed and answered our four research questions. Our primary research questions 
and answers determined the advantages and disadvantages of contract type and whether 
policy initiatives shaped the acquisition strategies for the Ford-class aircraft carriers. 
Also, we wanted to determine how the selection of contract type can shape future 
acquisitions, especially when acquiring new and immature technologies. From our 
research, we discovered that the major difference between the acquisitions of CVN-78 
and CVN-79 occurred during the detail design and construction contracts. For CVN-78, a 
hybrid cost type contract was awarded and was composed of multiple cost reimbursable 
type contracts. On the other hand, the contract selected for detail design and construction 
of CVN-79 was fixed price incentive fee. Additionally, policy initiatives like Better 
Buying Power (BBP) highly encouraged the use of incentive type contracts, especially 
fixed price contracts. From our research, we determined one of the reasons for the 
schedule and cost overruns experienced by the Ford-class aircraft carrier occurred during 
the acquisition of advanced yet immature technologies. MDAPs must strategically align 
contract type selection with technical and developmental risk in order to mitigate cost and 
schedule overruns. However, it must be noted that the selection of contract type alone 
does not indicate causation. 
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According to a research report by RAND Corporation, the “growth of U.S. Navy 
ship costs has exceeded the rate of inflation over the past four decades” (Arena et al.,     
2008, p. xiii). Due to the escalating cost for acquiring ships, the U.S. Navy is greatly 
concerned because of the increasing difficulty for affording ships needed to serve the fleet. 
For the U.S. Navy to meet its mission of maintaining security and deterrence through a 
sustained forward presence, the naval acquisition workforce is chartered to acquire the 
most sophisticated and technologically advanced combat systems in the world. The recent 
acquisitions of these advanced combat systems have come at a high cost to taxpayers and, 
due to technological delays, sometimes provide only a moderate advancement in 
warfighting capabilities. The Navy has paid a premium for its advanced warships, which 
are sometimes immediately returned to the shipyard for retrofitting and repair after product 
acceptance. As a result, the Navy has consistently experienced cost overruns and failed to 
meet the expected schedule for the acquisition of ships. According to a 2018 Government 
Accountability Office Report (GAO), “the Navy has received $24 billion more in funding 
than originally planned but has 50 fewer ships in its inventory” (Oakley, 2018, p. 1). 
Additionally, the Navy’s “shipbuilding programs have experienced years of construction 
delays and, even when the ships eventually reached the fleet, they fell short of quality and 
performance expectations” (Oakley, 2018, p. 1). 
Now, the Navy is “planning for the most significant fleet since increase in over 30 
years of shipbuilding, which includes some costly and complex acquisitions” (Oakley, 
2018, p. 1). Although the Navy is embarking upon its “ultimate goal of achieving a 355-
ship fleet, challenges in meeting shipbuilding cost, schedule, and performance baselines 
persist” (Oakley, 2018). This Joint Applied Project (JAP) analyzes the case history 
regarding the acquisition strategies, specifically contract types, used for both the Gerald R. 
Ford class of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers CVN-78 and CVN-79 and their major 
defense acquisition programs. By studying the case history of both the CVN-78 and CVN-
79 acquisitions, the differences in contracting strategies between these two Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) is identified and correlated to the performance of the 
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programs. While acquiring the USS Gerald R. Ford class of Aircraft Carriers, this JAP 
identifies the contract type utilized during each acquisition. Depending on the risk level 
and current DOD acquisition strategy, the research being conducted assesses if the 
appropriate contract type was selected. In addition, this JAP analyzed the selected contract 
type by determining if the contract type impacted either ship’s schedule, capability, and 
price. In essence, this JAP encompasses the contracting analysis of the CVN-78 and CVN-
79 programs. To meet its shipbuilding goals, the Navy must improve its acquisition process 
to mitigate issues that have contributed to its history of cost overruns. By accepting the 
delivery of these schedule delayed ships, the Navy not only continues to receive poorer 
quality while paying more, but contemporaneously depreciates its buying power.  
According to the Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power (BBP) 2.0, 
BBP is defined as “achieving efficiency and productivity in defense spending by delivering 
warfighting capabilities needed with the money available” (Kendall, 2012). According to 
an Acquisition Research Sponsored Report Series by Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), 
the BBP initiative emphasizes “(1) targeting affordability and controlling cost growth; (2) 
incentivizing productivity and innovating its industry; (3) reducing non-productive 
processes and bureaucracy; (4) promoting real competition; and (5) improving tradecraft 
in the acquisition of services” (Woodruff, 2012, p. 33). A critical factor in achieving BBP 
initiatives involves employing appropriate contract types while controlling costs through 
the acquisition life cycle. Department of Defense (DOD) aircraft programs classify as 
Acquisition Category I (ACAT I). All ACAT I programs are Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs (MDAPs). An MDAP is a “DOD acquisition program that is not a highly 
sensitive classified program and does not involve the acquisition of an automated 
information system” (Kozlak et al., 2017, p. 391). All MDAPs are required to annually 
submit Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) to Congress. “SARs outline a weapons 
system’s status and report current funding estimates as well as actual expenditures 
incurred” (Kozlak et al., 2017, p. 389). After MDAPs submits their SARs, Congress then 
analyzes them to evaluate program cost estimates and actual costs incurred. MDAPs have 
a high interest from Congress due to the severity of its cost and time overruns (Ben-Ari et 
al., 2010, p. 12). To diagnose why the Ford-aircraft carriers are experiencing cost and time 
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overruns, identifying different contracting strategies in relevant MDAP acquisition 
portfolios and evaluating their performance can contribute to a better understanding into 
the root causes of these issues. 
Understanding how Navy shipbuilding MDAPs have experienced cost overruns, 
schedule growth, and performance deficiencies, this research focuses on two Ford-class 
aircraft carriers: USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) and the USS John F. Kennedy (CVN-79). 
Through the life of the Ford-class acquisitions, the situation of cost and schedule overrun 
led Senator John McCain to call this carrier series an “egregious example of acquisition 
gone awry” (Columbia Daily Tribune, 2016). Being met with oversight challenges, 
acquisition of CVN-78 has been called into question about its milestone authority 
decisions. During the 2015 U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services meeting for 
Procurement, Acquisition, Testing, and Oversight of the Navy’s Ford-class aircraft carrier 
program, Chairman John McCain addressed the fact that the estimated procurement cost 
for CVN-78 had grown 27 percent since Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 budget submission 
(O’Rourke, 2021, p. 21). According to a GAO report in 2018 by Shelby Oakley, CVN-78 
costs were over $2 billion more than estimated. Chairman McCain opined his concerns 
about CVN-79 experiencing the same issues as the first iteration of the new ship, due to 
the unstable and immature technologies that were still being developed alongside the 
production of CVN-78. McCain, and other critics of the Ford-class acquisition, focused on 
the incorporation of these new, untested, and unfinished technologies such as the advance 
weapons elevators (AWE), electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS), and 
advanced arresting gear (AAG) as a major contributor to the cost growth and schedule 
delays of CVN-78. Incorporating “lessons learned from the construction of CVN-78, CVN-
79 is being built with an improved shipyard fabrication and assembly process” (O’Rourke, 
2021). Additionally, the Navy states that “lessons learned in building, testing, and 
certifying CVN-78’s AWEs will be applied to the AWEs of subsequent CVN-78 class 
carriers” (O’Rourke, 2021, p. 15). By implementing lessons learned from CVN-78, the 
goal for constructing CVN-79 entails eliminating pivotal contributors to cost performances 
challenges. Nevertheless, the estimated procurement costs of the CVN-79 have grown 
24.0% when compared to the FY2008 budget (O’Rourke, 2021). 
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Despite the cost challenges, the United States Navy continues to contract for the 
production of more Ford-class aircraft carriers, running concurrent development and 
production without the ability to provide acquisition officials, CNO, and ASN(RDA), and 
SECNAV adequate data to make informed business decisions on program progression. 
Therefore, the purpose of this research is to study the contract types selected in response 
to the risk profiles caused by an unstable design and immature technologies during the 
acquisition of both CVN-78 and CVN-79. The Navy is at risk to continue to experience 
cost and schedule growth as long as there is a mismatch between the contract type most 
appropriate to develop and acquire advanced warfighting systems for aircraft carriers and 
the contract types employed during the acquisition programs.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research questions this thesis answers includes what the U.S. Navy 
can learn from the selection of contract type for the acquisition portfolios of CVN-78 and 
CVN-79. Besides determining the contract types utilized for these MDAPs, this research 
determines the advantages and disadvantages of contract type selection. Additionally, this 
research analyzes policies or initiatives that affected the contract type selection for CVN-
78 and CVN-79. Therefore, this thesis poses four research questions: 
1. Primary research questions 
• What were the advantages and disadvantages in terms of contract type 
selection used in the acquisition of CVN-78 versus CVN-79? 
• What policies or initiatives shaped the decision to choose the contract 
types during the acquisitions of CVN-78 and CVN-79? Was the intent of 
the initiatives ultimately successful during the acquisition? 
Besides studying the contract portfolios and the initiatives that helped influence the 
contract type selection for these acquisition portfolios, this research further analyzed how 
contract type selection can shape future acquisitions and determine lessons learned going 
forward. 
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2. Secondary research questions 
• How can contract type shape future acquisitions to deliver the expected 
capabilities, on time, and within the planned acquisition cost? 
• How can future DOD acquisition strategy be changed to better guide 
acquisition professionals on how to choose contract type when acquiring 
new/immature technologies? 
Our findings reveal that the Navy acquired CVN-78 and CVN-79 under different 
contract types. A hybrid cost type contract was used for the lead ship, CVN78, and a FPIF 
contract for CVN79. The lead ship had considerable manufacturing risk which warrants 
the hybrid cost type contract, despite the increased risk of the Navy to incur additional 
costs. The second ship, CVN-79, shared overrun risk with the contractor through a FPIF 
contract. The risk, however, did not decrease as a result of the immature design. The 
contractor may have been incentivized to control cost, but ultimately was unable to meet 
the original cost and schedule estimates as a result of the redesign issues; the FPIF contract 
did not impact the contractor’s behavior in any significant way. The cost of CVN-79 did 
not increase significantly, but as a result of the redesign issues on CVN-78, the schedule 
of CVN-79 was significantly delayed. The advantage for the Navy to using a cost type 
contract while the design is immature is that it enables timely delivery of the ship without 
sacrificing the technological capability. 
The decision to use the FPIF contract for CVN-79 was likely heavily impacted by 
the cultural bias of the Navy, which has been historically documented to favor FPIF 
contracts for shipbuilding, as well as recency bias resulting from the BBP initiatives which 
reinforced the Navy’s practice of using FPIF by championing the contract type as a cost 
savings measure. The BBP initiatives highlight the benefits of the FPIF contract but could 
have expanded on the decision-making process when choosing a contract type for the 
unique acquisition’s needs. In the case of CVN-79, the FPIF contract was likely 
unsuccessful in achieving the intended results. However, future acquisitions can benefit 
from learning from the CVN-79 acquisition and choose the correct type for their specific 
risk profile. The Navy could have sought other means to control cost growth, schedule 
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creep and receive the intended technological capability then the FPIF contract for CVN-
79. When contracting for the next MDAP, contracting professionals should consider 
keeping the risk with the government until the design is mature and stable. As new 
contracting professionals analyze previous acquisitions, they will develop additional 
guidance which can focus on how an acquisition professional should determine which 
contract type to choose. By providing clearer guidance on how to perform and make 
educated decisions based on the unique circumstances of the acquisitions, the 
government’s future acquisitions will be more likely to succeed in managing cost, 
schedule, and technical performance. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE 
According to research regarding cost and schedule overruns experienced by the 
navy, “most Navy major defense acquisition programs assessed have had cost growth, 
schedule delays or both since first full estimate” (Werner, 2020). Ideally, acquisition 
business cases should balance resources by aligning concepts of technology, 
manufacturing and integrating maturity, design knowledge, and contract type. Selecting 
the correct contract type remains imperative for MDAP acquisition portfolios because this 
decision determines the responsibility for unresolved risks. By failing to align contract type 
with risk, the Navy will continue to derive results of less capable, smaller fleets while 
failing to meet its fiduciary duty of properly managing taxpayer dollars. Therefore, 
analyzing contract type for the portfolio acquisition of the Ford-class aircraft carriers and 
its impact on cost, schedule, and performance provides clarity about the advantages and 
disadvantages of contract type selection for the acquisition of both ships, CVN-78 and 
CVN-79. Likewise, analyzing the authors’ secondary research questions entails 
determining the various policies which shaped the acquisition plan and the incentives on 
selecting contract type. By analyzing the influence of policy initiatives on Navy 
Shipbuilding MDAPs, we address the impact these resources had on contract type selection 
during the acquisitions of CVN-78 and CVN-79. Finally, researching the acquisition 
portfolios of CVN-78 and CVN-79 has enabled us to determine a standard for prudent 
decision-making regarding contract type selection when conducting future acquisitions of 
MDAPs. Discovering and documenting these best practices could improve output of 
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performance, and reduce obsolescence issues resulting from immature designs, ultimately 
reducing shipbuilding costs. 
C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This research studies the case history of both the CVN-78 and CVN-79 acquisitions 
and identifies the differences in contracting strategies between these two MDAPs. The 
results of identifying the differences in contracting strategies were then correlated to the 
performance of the programs. In studying the contracting analysis of CVN-78 and CVN-
79, the authors determine the variables relevant to the DOD’s acquisition strategy, other 
acquisition reform strategies, and incentives influencing contract type. Data in this study is 
derived from existing contracts, solicitations, and requirements documents pertaining to 
CVN-78 and CVN-79. The data for this research derives advantages and disadvantages of 
the selected contract type. The advantages and disadvantages are analyzed by measuring 
the cost, schedule, performance/quality, and assessment of risk. Analyzing the advantages 
and disadvantages of contract types used in the acquisition of CVN-78 and CVN-79 helped 
discover lessons learned from the case study. In addition, another benefit from studying 
the case of contract type includes an analysis of the strengths, weakness, opportunities, and 
threats (SWOT) of selecting the contract type. Understanding the advantages and 
disadvantages of contract type selection in the CVN-78 and CVN-79 results in an analysis 
on the impact contract type has on schedule, delivered capabilities, cost, and risk-
assessment. 
After determining the risk profile and contract type for both acquisitions, this 
research analyzes DOD’s policy initiatives that influenced contract type selection. The 
analysis of DOD policy initiatives is used to determine whether their influence on contract 
type selection had instigated poor performance capabilities, cost overruns, and schedule 
slippage during the acquisitions of CVN-78 and CVN-79. By comprehending the evolution 
of initiatives, understanding the intent of those initiatives, and analyzing whether or not 
these initiatives influenced the program’s overall performance, the authors analyzed 
whether policy influenced the desired outcome. Finally, we opine lessons learned from the 
research and analysis, state conclusions, and provide our recommendations. 
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D. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The remainder of this document is organized as follows: 
• To establish the historical context of this topic, Chapter II of this research 
provides a complete overview of the Ford-class of aircraft carriers. 
• To understand the current research and establish familiarity with the 
acquisition of the Ford-aircraft carriers, Chapter III of this research 
includes a Literature Review. 
• To describe the process we used to collect data and perform an 
examination on the acquisition portfolios of CVN-78 and CVN-79, 
Chapter IV of this research is our analysis on the topic. 
• To explain the findings of our research and discuss the future implications 







In recent years, Navy shipbuilding has struggled to deliver products at the estimated 
cost, on schedule, and with the planned capabilities. To better understand how the DOD 
can overcome the issues of cost growth, schedule delays, and capability shortfalls, we 
analyzed the recent acquisitions of the Ford-class carriers CVN-78 and CVN-79. The Ford-
class portfolio included multiple contract types for the ships and the major subcomponents, 
which makes it particularly useful in understanding how future acquisition business cases 
should address contract type to properly balance the risk in acquiring essential systems that 
are not yet fully understood. This chapter establishes a historical understanding of the 
CVN-78 and CVN-79 acquisitions, their major subcomponent acquisitions, the DOD 
acquisition strategies and policies of the time, and the stakeholders involved in the 
acquisition process. 
A. HISTORY OF CVN-78 
The USS Gerald R. Ford, also known as CVN-78, is the “first aircraft carrier 
redesign in over 40 years, replacing the Nimitz-class carrier design” (O’Rourke, 2021, p. 
4). The last significant change to the design of an aircraft carrier was in 1975 when the USS 
Nimitz CVN-68 was commissioned. The lead ship for the new Ford-class aircraft carrier, 
CVN-78, illustrated in Figure 1 below, provides increased capability to the fleet, leveraging 
cutting-edge technology that had not yet been tested and evaluated in the early acquisition 
phases but would be viable at the time of delivery. According to GAO, the size and 
complexity of acquiring the USS Gerald R. Ford requires “funding for design, long-lead 
materials, and construction over many years” (Mackin, 2014, p. 6). Therefore, the Navy 
has awarded contracts for “two phases of construction- construction preparation and detail 
design and construction” (Mackin, 2014, p. 6). Since 2008, “Newport News Shipbuilding 
has been constructing CVN-78 under a cost-reimbursement contract for detail design and 
construction” (Mackin, 2014, p. 6). According to O’Rourke, “all U.S. aircraft carriers 
procured since FY1958 have been built by Huntington Ingalls Industries/Newport News 
Shipbuilding (HII/NNS) of Newport News, Virginia” (O’Rourke, 2021, p. 4). This is 
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because “HII/NNS is the only U.S. shipyard that can build large-deck, nuclear powered 
aircraft carriers” (O’Rourke, 2021, p. 4). Although the CVN-78 was commissioned in 
2017, “technical issues regarding the weapon elevators and other ship systems have 
delayed the ship’s first deployment to 2022 at the earliest” (O’Rourke, 2021, p. 15). 
 
Figure 1. USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78). 
Source: U.S. Navy Photo (n.d.). 
The purpose behind acquiring the Ford Class was to replace the Nimitz class by 
creating a preeminent asset to maintain security and deterrence through sustained forward 
presence. Succeeding the Nimitz class, the USS Gerald R. Ford class provides the U.S. 
Navy with greater lethality, survivability, joint-operability, while harnessing unmatched 
versatility (O’Rourke, 2021). In an attempt to design the Navy’s most advanced aircraft 
carrier for the future, the design margins of CVN-78 include allowing the integration of 
future manned and unmanned aircraft. The newly integrated designs of CVN-78 include 
the A1B nuclear reactor, replacing steam catapults with EMALS, enlarged flight deck and 
aft positioned island, implementing faster elevators, increasing electrical power generation 
capacity, allowing for future technologies, reducing manpower, and implementing an AAG 
(Francis, 2015). By establishing acquisition requirements with cutting-edge technology, 
the Navy ensured that CVN-78 is capable of carrying out missions across a full spectrum 
11 
of operations (Francis, 2015). For instance, CVN-78 capabilities range from large-scale 
combat operations to deterrence and human assistance. Maintaining flexibility and 
adaptability, CVN-78 ensures the United States Navy maintains dominance in naval 
operations across the globe with the most advanced ship at sea. 
Even with the copious capability upgrades on CVN-78, the Navy projected a future 
cost savings in operation and maintenance costs. However, technological challenges during 
production have persisted, causing severe cost, schedule, and performance overruns, which 
have placed the Ford-class carrier’s future in jeopardy. Ever since construction began on 
CVN-78, technical issues have delayed deployment. These delays have forced the 
deployment schedule to slip, costing the Navy both the tangible money spent to prepare 
CVN-78 for its mission and the intangible cost of focusing on the next ship’s build. 
In particular, upon initial delivery of CVN-78, the Navy has experienced reliability 
issues with several of the critical subcomponents, driving the need for additional spares to 
support the ship’s testing. Preparing for sufficient sparing of parts and equipment continues 
to be a challenge for the newest carrier group. CVN-78 has not yet worked through the 
reliability issues with three critical future weapon systems integral to the ship’s flight 
operations: AWE, EMALS, and AAG (O’Rourke, 2021). As a result of the immature 
design of these critical systems driving reliability issues, the cost of CVN-78 is projected 
to overrun by more than 24 percent, when compared to the 2008 baseline (O’Rourke, 
2021). 
Some of these future systems were so controversial that in 2019, Navy Secretary 
Richard Spencer informed the president that if the weapons elevators were not functioning 
when CVN-78 was ready to pull out, the president could fire him (Eckstein, 2019). As of 
March 2021, the weapon elevators were 94% complete and are expected to be fully 
functional by the end of 2021 (Fabey, 2021). The mission faces significant risk if the AWEs 
fail, so to increase the reliability of this critical subsystems, CVN-78 is slated to undergo 
significant retrofitting and upgrades before it can be deployed as intended. In addition to 
the risk these new technologies place on the reliability of the critical systems, alongside 
the procurement of CVN-78, the Navy continues to contract for the engineering and 
manufacturing development and well as testing and evaluation. As a result, procurement 
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costs for CVN-78 have grown 24.7% as of FY2021, and the total estimate ship procurement 
cost for CVN-78 is $13.3 billion (O’Rourke, 2021).  
Due to the delay in deploying CVN-78 and constant cost growth, the Navy has 
exercised efforts to stem cost growth and efficiently manage costs in accordance with the 
oversight requirements. Currently, the United States Congress is making a decision on 
CVN-78 that could impact the Navy’s capabilities, funding requirements, and shipbuilding 
industrial base. In an attempt to control cost growth, the United States Congress mandated 
that MDAPs must be restructured. Additionally, the Congressional Research Service states 
“MDAPs have their most recent milestone approval revoked if it crosses the Nunn-
McCurdy critical breach threshold of 25% over the current baseline estimate or 50% over 
the original baseline estimate” (Schwartz & O’Connor, 2016, p. 2). Nunn-McCurdy 
thresholds have not yet been breached, despite the cost overruns of CVN-78, however this 
is largely due to the structure of the program’s multi-ship acquisition plan (Schwartz & 
O’Connor, 2016). 
Even with implementing cost caps and incrementally funding the completion of the 
ship, the Navy has not been able to mitigate cost growth during CVN-78 production. The 
Congressional Budget Office addressed the costs issues, citing the Navy’s estimate of the 
cost for the first carrier was too optimistic. Instead of trending the actual costs and schedule 
delays experienced over the previous decade, the Navy has utilized their initial low-cost 
estimate and asserted that the construction and cost of CVN-78 would be less than the 
acquisition costs of predecessor ships, despite the untested future weapon systems. 
However, the Navy’s confidence level in the estimate for CVN-78 was below 50 percent, 
meaning the cost of construction had more than a 50 percent chance of exceeding the 
estimate of costs (Congressional Budget Office, 2008).  
Despite the increasing costs, ensuring the readiness of CVN-78 has remained a top 
priority for the DOD. The U.S. Navy continues to address technical issues by allocating 
available resources to support the post shakedowns which validate the ship’s critical 
capabilities. Underestimating the initial budget, the Navy intended to find cost savings 
through the installation of CVN-78’s new systems. However, the new systems have not 
provided the projected cost savings due to their technology and manufacturing immaturity 
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and integration challenges, and instead have driven costs higher than estimates (O’Rourke, 
2017). These counteracting forces have multiplied the impact to the acquisition’s estimate 
at completion and have presented new challenges to the acquisition team. To correct 
deficiencies, ensure safety on the ship, and deliver operational capabilities, the Navy’s 
acquisition team will continue to need additional funding.  
B. HISTORY OF CVN-79 
The second ship in the Ford-class, the USS John F. Kennedy (CVN-79), started 
procurement in FY2013, and has the same design requirements as the lead ship. The Navy’s 
current proposed budget estimates the ship’s procurement cost at about $11.4 billion, or 
$1.9 billion less than CVN-78 (O’Rourke, 2021). CVN-79 acquired the same new 
technologies incorporated into CVN-78, “comprising dramatic advances in propulsion, 
power generation, ordnance handling, and aircraft launch system” (Shulgin, 2019). For the 
acquisition of CVN-79, “HII received an undefinitized contract award from the U.S. Navy 
to shift the delivery strategy for the aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy from a two-phase 
delivery to a single phase” (Bourne, 2020). In addition to new technology and warfighting 
capabilities, CVN-79 was constructed under a fixed-price incentive fee (FPIF) contract 
(Mackin, 2014). Overall, “CVN-79’s design involves an improved shipyard fabrication and 
assembly process that incorporates lessons learned from the construction of CVN-78” 
(O’Rourke, 2021, p. 7). Possessing fewer overall components and extended internal dry-
docking, CVN-79 is scheduled for completion by 2024. Considering the cost overrun, 
schedule slippage, and performance underruns experienced by CVN-78, CVN-79 has 
implemented efforts to frontload work to lower costs while meeting technical capabilities. 
Implementing lessons learned from CVN-78 in terms of incremental funding, the Navy’s 
plan involves eliminating key contributors to the cost overruns that CVN-78 experienced.  
The cost of the CVN-79 acquisition continues to creep up, and despite the detailed 
plan to control cost has a projected overrun in excess of 27 percent more than the 2008 
baseline (O’Rourke, 2021). To deliver the ship at or under the congressional mandated cost 
cap of $11.5B, the Navy revised their acquisition strategy, by postponing an estimated 
“$200 million - $250 million in previously planned capability upgrades of the ship’s 
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combat systems to be completed well after the ship is operational” (Mackin, 2014, p. 2). 
Despite the Navy’s efforts to control cost growth by implementing lessons learned from 
CVN-78, the acquisition of CVN-79 continues to present a high risk of future cost growth. 
Consequently, the “Navy may request additional funding through post-delivery budget 
accounts not included in calculating the ship’s end cost” (Mackin, 2014, p. 1). Expecting 
completion in 2024 and deploying the CVN-79 in 2026, it appears FY21 will appropriate 
up to $71 million toward CVN-79 (O’Rourke, 2021). With this appropriation, the Navy 
possesses a plan to reduce cost and schedule overruns. For instance, the Navy desires a 
single-phase delivery of the ship in order to leverage opportunity costs and create an 
efficient schedule. Additionally, by implementing the lessons learned from CVN-78, the 
production of the USS John F. Kennedy is progressing at a much-improved rate. However, 
based on the estimate at completion, the cost for CVN-79 continues to creep up as a result 
of schedule delays relating to electrical, sheet metal, painting, and platform engineering 
work (Capaccio, 2020). At the current spending rate, the budget for CVN-79 will be 
exhausted prior to completion.  
C. GERALD R. FORD CLASS MAJOR SUBCOMPONENTS 
The Gerald R. Ford class of aircraft carriers incorporated new systems that increase 
the Navy’s capability. Most of these new systems were contracted with a focus on reducing 
future sustainment and maintenance costs while providing the Navy the ability to deter 
aggressors. In doing so, the Ford class aircraft carrier advances the fleet into the future of 
combat. With the fleet’s improved capabilities and future cost reduction of a stronger, 
leaner Navy, these cutting-edge technologies are critical to the Navy’s success. These new 
critical subsystems have been contracted for a variety of different contract types, with 
various degrees of success. The AWE, EMALS, and AAG, three of the major 
subcomponents, have contributed to the delivery of the schedule delays and cost overruns 
of the Ford class program acquisition.  
With an anticipated final completion date in 2021 on CVN-78, the AWE system 
has been a significant driver to the schedule delays and increase costs associate with the 
increased production cost of CVN-78 and CVN-79. Acquired under the same production 
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contract as the carriers, the Ford-class aircraft carrier design includes 11 AWEs, which 
move “missiles and bombs from the ship’s weapon magazines up to the ship’s flight deck, 
so that they can be loaded onto aircraft that are getting ready to take off from the ship” 
(O’Rourke, 2021, p. 13). Without functioning AWEs, the aircraft carrier’s ability to arm 
aircraft is limited, which could be catastrophic to the mission. A failure of the AWEs during 
combat operations would directly impact the lethality of the Navy’s greatest weapon 
platform and jeopardize lives. By the end of 2019, only four of the 11 AWEs were 
completed, tested, and certified (O’Rourke, 2021).  
The CVN-78 and CVN-79 acquisitions included a new type of aircraft catapult 
called, EMALS, and aircraft arresting gear (AAG). The production of EMALS and AAG 
took place separately from the Ford-class carriers. The Navy utilized a firm-fixed price 
(FFP) contract with a delivery incentive for the production contracts of CVN-78 and CVN-
79. The reliability of EMALS and AAG continues to be in question, the impact of this 
subcomponent jeopardizes the Ford-class carrier’s ability to rapidly deploy aircraft, which 
is the main purpose of an aircraft carrier. During recent testing between the post-
shakedown availability and the independent streaming event 11, the reliability of the two 
critical subcomponents were noted as “well below the requirement of mean cycles between 
operational mission failure” (O’Rourke, 2021). The reliability issues of EMALS and AAG 
have driven procurement cost overruns for EMALS and AAG which is detailed in Table 1 
below for the lead ship acquisition.  
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Table 1. CVN-78 Procurement Cost Growth for EMALS and AAG. 
Source: Mackin (2017b). 
Ford-Class Aircraft Carrier: Follow-On Ships Need More Frequent and Accurate Cost Estimates 
to Avoid Pitfalls of Lead Ship. 
 
EMALS and AAG have been a significant driver of cost overruns, contributing to 
approximately 40 percent of CVN-78’s procurement cost growth (Mackin, 2017b). During 
the development phase, the Navy recognized the excessive cost growth and acquired 
EMALS and AAG on separate contracts from the CVN-78 and CVN-79 in order to limit 
future production cost growth. When contracting for the EMALS and AAG systems, the 
Navy used a FFP contract as recommended in a program assessment review initiated by 
USD AT&L John Young (O’Rourke, 2021). The FFP contract limited the government’s 
risk of absorbing cost growth during the acquisition of EMALS and AAG. 
The FFP contract’s success in limiting the government’s absorption of cost overrun, 
is in large part a result of the active EMALS and AAG development contracts, which are a 
mix of cost type contracts and have borne the cost of development change during 
production. As the reliability issues were identified during CVN-78 production, the cost to 
address the deficiencies through rework, repair, or modification to design, was 
predominantly absorbed by the development contracts and has resulted in significant 
procurement cost growth documented in Table 1 above (Macklin, 2017).  
 
 
          





Cost Growth as a 
Percent of FY 2008 
Budget 
EMALS 317.7 M 669.7 M 352 M 111% 
AAG 75 M 147.6 M 72.6 M 97% 
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FFP contracts, like the ones used for EMALS and AAG, “provides maximum 
incentive for the contractor to control costs and perform effectively.” (FAR 16.202-1, 
2019). The production contracts were awarded concurrently with ongoing technology 
development and ship detail design, which resulted in uncertain final costs and 
performance (Mackin, 2017b). With the price fixed for the EMALS and AAG 
subcomponents, the Navy incentivized the delivery to have the subcomponents meet the 
schedule of the ship. The other new technologies were developed and produced on the main 
CVN-78 and CVN-79 contracts listed below. Even with the EMALS and AAG 
procurement being awarded on a FFP contract, they account for significant cost growth to-
date for the Ford-class program (O’Rourke, 2017). Despite the challenges with EMALS 
and AAG, the program has experienced recent success and is photographed in Figure 1 
below during the exercise which marked their 8,000 aircraft launches and recoveries aboard 
CVN-78. 
 
Figure 2. An F/A-18 lands on USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) using EMALS 
and AAG during the ship’s post-delivery test and trails.  
Source: U.S. Navy Photo (n.d.). 
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D. DESCRIPTION OF THE DOD ACQUISITION STRATEGY DURING 
ACQUISITION PLANNING, INCLUDE CONTRACT TYPE 
According to GAO, “the Ford class program received advanced procurement (AP) 
funding to initiate design activities, procure long-lead materials, and prepare for 
construction” (Francis, 2015, p. 13). Defense Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS) 217.103 states that AP is used in “MDAPs to obtain components whose long 
lead time requires early purchase in order to reduce the overall procurement lead time of 
the major end item” (AcqNotes, 2021). “By the time the Navy requested funding for 
construction, CVN-78 had already received $3.7 billion in advance procurement funding” 
(Francis, 2015, p. 14). Although the Ford-class received AP funding, the technologies were 
immature, cost estimates were unreliable, and had considerable unknowns (Francis, 2015, 
p.14). Even today the advanced technology continues to experience developmental delays, 
construction costs are surging, and planned procurement costs have been exceeded.  
The construction on CVN-78 began with an unrealistic business case due to an 
underestimation of cost and the planned acquisition of immature technologies. Considering 
the impact of critical immature technologies, the acquisition plan of CVN-78 was subject 
to extremely high risk in order to deliver the ship on-time while meeting cost objectives. 
Even with a severe risk factor of cost overruns, schedule delays, and reduced capabilities, 
the business case for CVN-78 was approved (Francis, 2015). Similar to CVN-78, the CVN-
79 was approved with an unrealistic business case. Although the cost of the USS John F. 
Kennedy sits well below the acquisition cost of CVN-78, the cost of CVN-79 exceeds the 
original estimation. Even with incorporating lessons learned from construction sequencing 
and other efficiencies from CVN-78, the CVN-79 is experiencing similar overruns.  
Comparing CVN-79 to CVN-78, the cost estimate for CVN-79 “assumed that the 
shipbuilder would lower construction costs by realizing efficiency gains” (Mackin, 2014, 
p. 30). Therefore, the Navy established cost and labor hour reduction goals in order to gain 
efficiencies in the acquisition plan. In 2013, the anticipated CVN-79 program reported to 
Congress that about 7 million to 12 million fewer labor hours will be needed to construct 
CVN-79 compared to CVN-78 (Mackin, 2014). As further reported by Mackin in 2014, 
the Navy cited lessons learned during the construction of CVN-78 and revising CVN-79’s 
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build plan to perform pre-outfitting work earlier in the build process as support for the 
reduction of labor hours for the CVN-79 acquisition (Mackin, 2014). Although the 
acquisition plan involved integrating these lessons learned from CVN-78 and gaining 
efficiencies by reducing labor hours, CVN-79 is estimated to cost more than originally 
anticipated. 
“Competition with other programs for funding creates pressure to overpromise, 
which contributed to the acquisition plan of CVN-78 to include unrealistic costs and 
schedules in the initial proposal” (Francis, 2015, p.1). Instead of proposing a realistic 
estimation by taking into consideration historical shipbuilding experiences with cost 
overruns the overall acquisition plan for CVN-78 constituted severe risk. With such high 
risk, the USS Gerald R. Ford class succumbed to the pressures of obtaining competition 
even while acquiring cutting edge technology, ultimately creating overly ambitious goals. 
Overall, the acquisition of the USS Gerald R. Ford class of ships incorporated “a single 
buyer, low volume, and a limited number of major sources” (Francis, 2015, p. 1). Despite 
the significant challenges and unsound acquisition justification, the business case for CVN-
78 and CVN-79 received approval, creating an incredible burden for the final acquisition 
phase. 
With the final acquisition phase concurrently running key test events and 
construction, “the burden of completing advanced technology development now falls 
during the most expensive phase of ship construction” (Francis, 2015, p. 5). Due to these 
concurrent events, the Navy decided to manage the remaining program risks by “deferring 
construction and installation of mission related systems” (Francis, 2015, p. 7). The deferred 
construction and installation resulted in the Navy’s labor hour estimation to be 2 million 
less than the shipbuilder’s (Francis, 2015). Consequently, the discrepancies in labor hours 
created additional risk, the immature systems required more manpower, and the acquisition 
has not yet benefitted from economies of scale. With its reliability shortfalls, the ship life 
cycle cost increased dramatically. In view of the high level of risk, the Navy selected a 
cost-plus-incentive fee (CPIF) contract type for the acquisition of CVN-78 and a fixed 
price incentive fee (FPIF) for the acquisition of CVN-79. 
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A CPIF contract is a “cost reimbursement type contract with a provision for a fee 
that is adjusted by a formula in accordance with relationships between total allowable and 
target costs” (National Contract Management Association, 2019, p.131). The purpose of 
selecting a CPIF type contract includes creating incentives for both the buyer and seller 
when development risks are high or requirements are ill-defined. While determining and 
negotiating fee amounts, performance measurements must be clear and objectively 
measurable. The purpose of determining and awarding fee involves incentivizing the seller 
over various ranges of cost performance. However, determining minimum and maximum 
fee amounts can be trouble due to the difficulty of objectively measuring performance, the 
cost to administer performance, and the appropriate surveillance needed to ensure the seller 
is implementing effective and efficient cost methods. CPIF contracts are considered cost 
reimbursement type contracts and contractors are only expected to execute their best efforts 
(Grady, 2016). Therefore, the reason for selecting a CPIF contract type is to mitigate an 
increase of performance risk because the requirements are not well-defined.  
On the other hand, NPS Report Analyzing Cost, Schedule, and Engineering 
Variances on Acquisition Programs states that FPIF contracts “are used when the 
government wants to incentivize technical performance and cost controls” (Griffin & 
Schilling, year, p. 20). For FPIF contracts, “cost uncertainties exist, but there is potential 
for cost reduction or performance improvement by giving seller a degree of cost 
responsibility and a positive profit incentive” (National Contract Management Association, 
2019, p. 131). Additionally, FPIF contracts must contain “target cost, target profit, ceiling 
price, and profit-sharing formula” (National Contract Management Association, 2019, p. 
131). According to Defense Acquisition University (DAU), the intention of a FPIF contract 
is to “provide the contractor a fair and reasonable incentive to assume an appropriate share 
of the cost risk” (DAU, n.d.). FPIF provides some shared risk with respect to cost overruns, 
but FPIF contracts are still considered fixed price. FPIF contracts should be implemented 
when contract requirements are better defined and understood. Figure 3 shows the contract 
type that should be selected based on program risk. 
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Table 2. Types of Contracts and Associated Program Risk. 
Source: Alder and Scherer (1998).  
Contract Type Risk Characteristics Description 
Fixed Price Low Performance 




Low levels of involvement 
resolving disconnects.  
Cost Type High Performance 




High levels of involvement in 
resolving project management 
issues 





rate production items.  
High levels of involvement in 
reacting to and fixing project 
and contract disconnects and 
issues 
Table 2. Project contracts: a decision matrix approach.  
 
Fixed Price contracts are not appropriate when development risk exists. In the end, 
the contract type selected should match the development risk and ensure there is less 
overall program risk. 
E. OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT ACQUISITION REFORM INITIATIVES   
In 2010, the Department of Defense introduced “reforms in its acquisition policies 
that would improve program outcomes and further strengthen practices when 
implemented” (Francis, 2013, p. 1). Titled Better Buying Power (BBP) by Frank Kendall, 
the intention of reforming acquisition policies involved “enforcing affordability 
constraints, instituting long term invest plan for portfolios, implementing should cost 
management, and eliminating redundancies” (Kendall, 2012). Ultimately, the goal of BBP 
incorporated doing more with less. 
While establishing a more capable and appropriately sized acquisition workforce, 
the BBP first incentivized target involved managing affordability and cost growth. To 
achieve this goal, an acquisition program must be conducted within a specified cost 
constraint while determining the maximum amount of resources that can be allocated. 
These acquisition controls would confirm the program could achieve affordability before 
granting milestone approval. Continuing with the notion of controlling cost growth, 
another mission for BBP included “driving productivity growth through will cost/should 
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cost management” (Kendall, 2012). To adequately display a program’s areas of 
improvement and justify each element of cost, a should cost analysis is conducted to 
scrutinize each element of program and eliminate unnecessary costs. In addition to 
controlling cost, BBP also incentivized the acquisition workforce to shorten schedule 
timelines.  
In an effort to incentivize programs to meet shorter timeline schedules, the BBP 
identified schedules which experienced simple programs delays and documented the 
impact on the delivery of needed capabilities and cost growth. Since programs need to 
compete for funding, level of effort patterns were settled into, which greatly increased 
schedule timelines (Kendall, 2012). Consequently, the BBP’s establishment of shorter 
program timelines resulted in expediting the process to modify requirements before 
obtaining the granting authority to proceed and ensuring requirements, to include 
schedules, achieved consistency. To achieve the objective of reducing cost and decreasing 
schedule overrun, the BBP recommended acquisition reform by encouraging programs to 
use fixed price incentive fee (FPIF) contracts with a 50/50 share line. 
Implementing FPIF with a 50/50 cost share line strictly aligns the government and 
sellers’ incentives. Being heavily incentivized, FPIF contracts require the government to 
know exactly what it needs and is most productive at managing risk when the requirement’s 
baseline does not change. FPIF awards also assume the seller possesses sufficient internal 
controls of their processes and their costs. Therefore, FPIF contracts share cost overruns 
between government and seller, while rewarding cost underruns and giving both sides an 
incentive for good performance (Mackin, 2017a). Prior to awarding FPIF contracts, the 
BBP also detailed the importance of promoting real competition. To promote real 
competition, the program must “present a competitive strategy at each program milestone” 
(Carter, 2010, p. 9). Obtaining competition for complex acquisition can be difficult, in 
order to promote competition, the acquisition team must research the market, breakout 
subcontracts, and adopt commercial strategies. If barriers of competition cannot be 
eliminated, then the acquisition team should conduct negotiations with single bid offerors 
during the performance price analysis. 
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Besides improving the overall foundation of acquisition, the BBP also sought to 
improving tradecraft in services acquisitions. By improving tradecraft in service 
acquisitions, the DOD adopted a uniform taxonomy of contract types when acquiring 
services. The taxonomy of contract type for service acquisitions remained predisposed 
toward cost reimbursement contracts. Issuing CPIF and cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) 
contracts for service acquisitions, “each program department must incentivize, achieve, 
and share in cost improvements over the period of performance” (National Contract 
Management Association, 2019). Ideally, selecting either CPFF or CPIF contract type for 
service acquisitions would improve productivity, cost efficiency, and reduce number of 
reviews to reduce non-productive processes. From the introduction by Ashton Carter in 
2010, CVN-78 was greatly influenced by BBP’s continuous process improvement 
imperative by following its incentives of affordability, should cost, and requirements 
assessment. 
To address its high risk with spending and acquisition, the DOD released BBP as 
an initiative for internal improvement. BBP “encompassed dozens of separate initiatives 
around controlling costs in major weapons systems, creating incentives for industry to cut 
costs and deliver more innovation, and increasing competition” (Serbu, 2017). By 
implementing BBP, the DOD promoted an acquisition environment that obligated dollars 
tactically, efficiently, and intelligently. Due to the ongoing risk with government 
acquisition, BBP and other implemented initiatives possessed fundamental purchasing 
guidance. As a result of BBP, these buying initiatives heavily influenced MDAPs. 
24 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
25 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The United States DOD’s mission is to “provide a lethal Joint Force to defend the 
security of our country and sustain American influence abroad” (Department of Defense, 
2018). To meet the goals of the DOD, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) must 
establish a National Defense Strategy which acknowledges the increasingly complex 
global challenges which threaten the U.S. ability to maintain peace through strength. Over 
the last several decades, a keystone in the National Defense Strategy has been acquisition 
affordability, which is detailed in the FY 2020 revisions of the U.S. Defense Acquisition 
System (DAS) DOD Directive 5000.01 and DOD Instruction 5000.02. Despite a focus on 
cost savings in modern acquisitions, the DOD has been unable to deliver MDAPs while 
adequately managing the triple constraint of program management: cost, schedule, and 
technical performance.  
Even with the shortfalls of the DOD’s management of the triple threat, “the 
acquisition system for decades has given the United States the most capable military in the 
world and has been improving both in the past and more recently” (Kendall, 2016, p. xvi). 
However, in recent years the United States has struggled to maintain our competitive edge 
and in order to meet our goals, must evaluate past acquisition hardships to understand why 
a program experienced cost overruns, schedule delays, and underdelivered technological 
capabilities. The results of the DAS failure to manage the triple threat has resulted in fewer 
MDAPs being procured at an increased acquisition cost (Dodaro, 2019). Dodaro identifies 
the importance of controlling costs, and the impact that knowledge-based acquisition 
practices can have on cost overruns for MDAPs. Dorado’s Weapon Systems annual 
assessment highlights the negative effects insufficient knowledge has on a program 
entering the acquisition cycle, but does not analyze the impact different contract type 
selection could have made on the cost overruns experienced by the identified MDAPs. 
As part of the continuous improvement effort, the DOD has been implementing the 
best practices outlined in Frank Kendall’s BBP initiatives, which among many things has 
a focus on employing appropriate contract types. The selection of the correct contract type 
to mitigate the acquisition’s risk profile is critical to the mission’s success; however, there 
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have been conflicting results in recent MDAP acquisitions. For example, the Navy’s 
shipbuilding practices when acquiring ships are notoriously complicated to manage and 
consistently experience delays from design to delivery. The Navy prefers a FPIF contract 
type and over the last ten years, the Navy has used FPIF contract types on over 80 percent 
of their shipbuilding contracts (Mackin, 2017a). Mackin discusses the Navy’s use of FPIF 
contracts, asserting the Navy’s selection of contract type is not a result of the BBP 
initiatives, but rather can be traced to the Navy’s acquisition culture as the practice has 
been in favor with shipbuilding programs for the last 40 years. Despite the Navy’s heavy 
use of FPIF contracts for shipbuilding, the acquisition team is not receiving the benefit 
described in the BBP initiative. The BBP establishes that FPIF contracts are effective tools 
in mitigating the perceived risk of a program’s successful delivery, promoting shipbuilder 
efficiency, and controlling costs, but Mackin does not relate the Navy’s acquisition practice 
to the BBP and analyzes why has the Navy fails to incentivize productivity in industry, to 
mitigate cost growth and schedule creep. Mackin asserts the Navy should maximize the 
effectiveness of FPIF contracts by better documenting their rational for the use of 
incentives and track the efficacy of the incentive throughout the long and complicated 
shipbuilding process.  
The BBP initiative’s recommendation involves leveraging FPIF contracts to 
encourage better cost and schedule performance outcomes, but BBP 2.0 specifically 
emphasizes the use of the “appropriate contract vehicle for the product or services being 
acquired” (Kendall, 2012). Mackin states that FPIF contracts are successful when a 
“program’s early production phase has begun or near the end of engineering and 
manufacturing development” (Mackin, 2017a, p. 10). In the case of many shipbuilding 
contracts, the Navy awarded the design and construct contract before retiring technical risk 
which ultimately resulted in the program’s cost growth (Mackin, 2017a). Mackin addresses 
the shortfalls experienced by shipbuilding programs and the different contract types used 
for CVN-78 and CVN-79; however, the research does not analyze forces that shaped the 
Navy’s choices for contract type and does not make a recommendation to shape future 
shipbuilding acquisition plans. Mackin primarily addresses the inconsistent documentation 
that should be in the acquisition file which provides the justification for the contract type 
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selected. There is a trend of the Navy using FPIF contracts, but there are no consistent 
standards to measure the effectiveness of the incentives to control the contractor’s 
behavior. With more detailed justification for each incentive element, the Navy would be 
able to better analyze their choices in order to make sound decisions during negotiations. 
The Navy’s shipbuilding contracts are using the BBP’s preferred FPIF contract 
type, but they are not fully evaluating the maturing of the technology and are awarding 
FPIF contract with immature and unstable designs. The Navy may not ultimately receive a 
deficiency-free ship at delivery, but rather one that matches the inadequate specifications. 
Frank Kendall established criteria for the use of FPIF contracts in his 2016 Annual Report, 
Performance of Defense Acquisition System, which state a fixed-price contract be selected 
for development when “1) Requirements are stable 2) Technologies are mature 3) The 
contractor is experienced 4) The contractor can absorb overruns 5) The contractor has a 
business case for absorbing any overruns that occur” (Kendall, 2016, p. 3). The authors 
analyzed the Navy’s preference of FPIF production contracts and their use with concurrent 
technology development to understand if a different contract would have resulted in the 
same cost growth. The Navy’s shipbuilding practice of having using active development 
contracts and production contracts provides a unique opportunity to evaluate the impact a 
selected contract type has on controlling risk and whether current policy initiatives are 
having their intended effect. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT TYPE USED AND 
POLICY INFLUENCE 
A. OVERVIEW 
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the contract types used in the acquisition 
of the USS Gerald R. Ford, CVN-78, and the USS John F. Kennedy, CVN-79, and the 
policies that influenced the Navy’s selection of contract type. We provide an analysis of 
the impact the selected contract type had on the acquisition, identifying correlations 
between contract type and the control of cost overruns, schedule creep, and technological 
performance as it relates to these specific acquisitions. In this analysis, we seek to address 
the impact contract type has on the Navy’s acquisition of MDAPs and whether modern 
policy initiative recommendations correctly influenced the Navy’s acquisition plan. 
We first identify the stakeholders involved the acquisition plan. Once the 
stakeholders are determined, we discuss the acquisition plan’s use of multiple contracts in 
support of the acquisition and whether or not the contract’s risk was managed as intended. 
The data used in this analysis was collected from both Naval Sea Systems Command and 
Naval Air Systems Command as well as available resources as cited. We synthesize the 
data to analyze and understand the intended effect the Navy desired when issuing the 
contract by reviewing the different contract types used throughout the acquisition of both 
aircraft carriers. The authors then address the effectiveness that contract type had on 
controlling risk, specifically when the acquisition plan uses concurrent development, and 
production contracts as is the Navy’s common practice in shipbuilding. 
We then provide an overview of the policies that address the selection of contract 
type based on risk and discuss if policy recommendations were correctly interpreted given 
the specific acquisition plan used by the Navy in the procurement of ships with CVN-78 
and CVN-79 as examples. Through the collection of policy initiatives active during the 
acquisition, the authors review the contract type selected and analyze if the Navy shaped 
their acquisition strategy as a result of current policies. Lastly, the authors analyze if current 
policies related to contract type selection had their intended impact on controlling costs, 
maintaining schedule, and supporting the delivery of the intended technology. Following 
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the analysis, the authors present our conclusion of correlations observed between contract 
type selection and the program maintaining their acquisition baselines in Chapter VI. 
B. CONTRACT TYPES USED AND THEIR IMPACT 
The development effort for the Ford-class aircraft carrier group, from concept 
through production, was not acquired on a single contract. The effort was awarded on 
multiple cost type contracts through the award of the lead ship and then moved to a FPIF 
contract for full rate production. The main contract was awarded to Newport News 
Shipbuilding (NNS) in 2000 for the development and production of the ship; however, two 
major subcomponents, EMALS and AAG, would ultimately be developed and acquired on 
separate contracts starting 2004 with General Atomics (GA). Early cost type contracts for 
the Ford-class carrier focused on the ship’s concept. In 2004, the beginning of construction 
preparation for the Ford-class carrier took place on a NNS CPAF contract, while the 
decision was made to acquire EMALS and AAG directly from GA, instead of as a 
subcontractor to NNS. The system development and demonstration of EMALS was 
awarded on a CPAF and AAG on a separate CPFF contract directly to GA in 2003 and 
2004 respectively. The remaining technologies were planned to be acquired under the 
single CVN-78 construction preparation contract awarded to NNS, a cost type contract. 
With successful progress on the development and construction preparation contracts, 
the Navy awarded a 2008 CVN-78 Detail Design & Construction contract to NNS as well as 
a separate contract in 2009 to GA for EMALS and AAG production. CVN-78 Detail Design 
& Construction was awarded as a hybrid contract with the following mix of contract types; 
CPIF, CPAF, and CPFF. This hybrid contract would be responsible for the majority of the 
USS Gerald R. Ford’s development and delivery. The contract awarded to GA for EMALS 
and AAG production was negotiated as a FFP contract, where the EMALS and AAG 
subcomponents would be delivered and installed on the CVN-78 as government furnished 
property. The CPAF and CPFF development contracts awarded in 2003 and 2004 for 
EMALS and AAG would remain active through the delivery of CVN-78.  
By integrating lessons learned from the acquisition and testing of CVN-78, the 
Navy updated their acquisition strategy for CVN-79. The Navy and NNS learned 
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efficiencies by producing a line of similar ship builds between CVN-78 and CVN-79. 
Similar ship modules will benefit an assembly line by improving production learning 
curves and producing sustainable supply chains which will reduce costs. CVN-79 received 
its own set of contracts awarded to NNS, a 2009 CVN-79 Construction Preparation contract 
which utilized the CPFF and CPIF contract type, as well as a 2015 Detail Design & 
Construction which was awarded with a FPIF contract. The EMALS and AAG 
subcomponents were again awarded on a FFP contract with GA, for the delivery of a 
functioning system aboard CVN-79. The contract type awarded to CVN-79 is the first 
major difference between the CVN-78 and CVN-79 acquisitions. At the time of CVN-79’s 
award, CVN-78 had not yet been delivered and the development contracts for CVN-78, 
EMALS, and AAG were actively modifying their respective designs. The main contracts 
discussed are provided in Table 3 for further analysis. 
Table 3. Contract Type for the Program Name 
Contractor Contract Program Name 
Contract 































EMALS and AAG production 






CVN 79 Construction 






CVN 79 Detail Design & 





EMALS and AAG production 
contract for CVN 79 (and 80) FFP 5/8/2014 
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The Ford-class carriers represent the first significant redesign in almost 50 years 
and presents significant risk as it incorporates cutting edge technology to deliver the largest 
warship ever conceived (Mackin, 2017b). Maintaining cost and schedule goals is a 
herculean task when acquiring unproven advanced technologies, considering the severe 
amount of technical risk with the Ford-class carriers, it is not a reasonable expectation to 
be able to anticipate the hurdles experienced through development. As a result of 
significant risk, the use of a cost type contract is recommended, which means the cost risk 
of the acquisition is predominantly shifted to the government. In situations such as these, 
performance management must be closely monitored so that changes to the acquisition 
program baseline can be understood, documented, and addressed.  
The different contract types establish balance risk between the government and 
contractor. Depending on the acquisition’s risk profile, each contract type has a set of 
strengths and weaknesses. The following SWOT analysis is provided to document the 
benefits and shortcomings for the two incentive type contracts utilized in the subject 
acquisition. 




Table 5. FPIF SWOT Analysis 
 
 
Despite the significant risk posed by the development, installation, and integration 
of advanced technologies on the Ford-class aircraft carriers, the Navy received 
authorization to award production contracts. In 2015, the GAO noted that both cost and 
labor hours for CVN-78 was underestimated and the design was immature (Mackin, 
2017b). This posed the greatest risk for the government and drove cost growth in the form 
of additional testing delays and reduced capabilities. The risk was shifted to the 
government in the Navy’s selection of cost type contracts; however, the immature design 
and unproven technologies supported the government’s absorption of risk. The immature 
design increased the government’s share of costs to account for delays resulting from 
redesigns to address performance issues and the cost associated with programmatic 
challenges of a shifting schedule. In an attempt mitigate a portion of the risk, the Navy 
incentivized their cost type development contracts. The incentives would ultimately not 
prove to be influential on the contractor’s ability to control cost growth or to meet the 
scheduled delivery of the ship when the technology is immature and the requirements 
unrealistic. As the detail design & construction contract started to overrun, the government 
and NNS agreed to convert the contract from a ‘level of effort, fixed fee’ contract to a 
completion contract with a firm target and incentive fee. The agreement would limit cost 
growth if there were no modifications to the ship. However, the new terms and conditions 
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of the completion contract did not completely stop the cost growth as CVN-78 continued 
to be modified to incorporate more money for design changes. Per O’Rourke’s data in his 
2021 March update on the Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program, CVN-78 
has experienced cost growth of 27% when compared to its 2008 estimate and 8.1% when 
compared to the 2013 re-baseline (O’Rourke, 2021). The continued cost growth 
experienced, even after the acquisition baseline was updated, demonstrates the 
unrecognized program changes which occurred despite the incentives awarded and paid 
through the CPIF contracts. 
Contracts that are acquiring new technologies, critical to the National Defense 
Strategy are likely to experience challenges during development. With so much 
programmatic risk, the only reasonable path forward for the acquisition is for the 
government to absorb the cost risk through a flexibly priced contract. This was the case for 
CVN-78 and for the construction preparation contract for CVN-79. However, in an attempt 
to mitigate cost creep, the Navy utilized a FPIF contract for CVN-79’s detail design & 
construction. According to federal acquisition regulation (FAR) Part 16, FPIF contracts 
should be used when “the contractor’s assumption of a degree of cost responsibility will 
provide a positive profit incentive for effective cost control and performance” (FAR 
16.403(b)(2), 2019). At the time of the author’s research, the CVN-79 FPIF contract has 
not yet been completed, but as stated in O’Rourke’s March 2021 update, the ship is 
projected to have a cost overrun of 24% when compared to the 2008 baseline and -0.1% 
when compared to the 2013 re-baseline (O’Rourke, 2021). The estimated cost growth when 
compared to the 2008 baseline demonstrates the large amount of unknown risks to the 
program, but identify that those risks were predominately known and under control by the 
re-baseline in 2013.  
The acquisitions of the ships experienced cost overruns and schedule delays, but 
the majority of the cost overruns experienced by CVN-78 and CVN-79 programs are 
attributable to the EMALS and AAG subcomponents which were specifically acquired on 
separate contracts in an attempt to control the cost growth of the aircraft carrier’s most 
iconic weapon system. The production contracts for CVN-78 and CVN-79 were awarded 
as FFP contracts and did not significantly increase from their estimate at contract award 
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through their current projected cost at delivery. The SAR for CVN-78 as of FY 2018 
President’s Budget stated “The Navy was successful in using Firm Fixed Price (FFP) 
Contracting for EMALS on the CVN-78 to control costs and has utilized the same 
contracting approach on the CVN-79” (Garfinkel, 2017, p. 45). However, in the case of 
EMALs and AAG, the development contracts remained open and active, and the cost to 
address design issues was incurred by the cost type development contracts, instead of the 
shifting cost to the production contracts, which as a result of the FFP contract type, should 
have been allocated to the contractor. Allocating all of the cost to the contractor on the FFP 
production contract may not be reasonable and could have prevented them from delivering 
the assets. However, by keeping the development contracts active, the Navy essentially 
created a multi-contract acquisition under a cost type contract. An objective view of the 
part that the FFP contract type played in cost savings to the Navy needs to consider the 
costs incurred on the development contracts.  
FFP and FPIF contracts can be excellent selections to mitigate cost creep and shift 
the cost risk from the government to the contractor. However, they are best used with a 
mature acquisition with stable designs. The misuse of FFP and FPIF contracts can create 
larger liabilities when used improperly, and often the government is incurring the cost by 
modifying the contract instead of shifting the risk to the contractor. When the fixed priced 
contracts required a design change, the fixed priced contract would issue a stop order and 
the cost to address the design issue would be allocated to the cost type development 
contract. As a result, the government incurred administrative costs to properly manage their 
contract portfolio, but did not significantly benefit from the award of a fixed price contract. 
As is the case with the production of EMALS and AAG for both CVN-78 and CVN-79, 
immature designs represent an opportunity for cost growth as the amount of unknown 
issues poses a significant risk. As desirable as a fixed priced contract may be, its use in 
acquiring MDAPs that require the development of technologies and that do not yet have 
mature designs may have generated more administrative effort, rather than streamline the 
acquisition process and result in cost savings. By overlapping the technology development, 
design, and construction phases the Ford-class carrier’s program risk significant increased, 
this may be the single largest driver for cost increase to this program’s acquisition. 
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The Navy has a history of using incentives when acquiring ships, but the incentives 
consistently fail to impact the contractor’s ability to deliver the anticipated capability. As 
seen in the acquisition of CVN-78 and CVN-79, as well as their major subcomponents, 
none of the implemented incentives resulted in reduced costs, adherence to schedule, or the 
delivery of the expected technological capability. When comparing the advantages and 
disadvantages of the contract type selection for the acquisition of CVN-78 versus CVN-
79, we find the incentives used for CVN-79 were no more effective in limiting cost 
overruns and schedule creep or improving the capability of the production. There are many 
factors that contributed to the overruns, however the fixed price contract type will remain 
ineffective in limiting the government’s absorption of cost until the development contract 
is completed and the design is mature. The Navy’s selection of a FPIF for CVN-79 is 
aligned with the BBP’s general recommendation and the recency bias identified in 
historical Navy shipbuilding practices. The intent of BBP was to encourage FPIF contract, 
but only when the business case fit the contract type’s risk profile. As a result of the practice 
of choosing a FPIF contract with an unstable and immature design, the acquisition did not 
have the intended impact as the true cost was shifted away from the fixed price contracts 
to the cost type development contracts. The Navy’s overuse and reliance on fixed price 
type contracts for development efforts  may not be a good fit for the acquisition of MDAPs. 
Utilizing the right contract type can shape future acquisitions by appropriately allocating 
risk based on the maturity of design and can help reduce administrative burden, while 
seeking cost savings through other means. More specific guidance on choosing the right 
contract type, instead of a preferred contract type, can help acquisition professionals make 
the right decision for their current situation and should focus on documenting supportable, 
definable, and trackable incentive elements that should only be authorized for payment if 
the criteria are met. 
C. POLICY INFLUENCE 
Frank Kendall’s BBP 2.0 envisioned contracting agencies applying appropriate 
contract types that controlled costs through the acquisition life cycle. To manage 
affordability and cost growth, Kendall’s BBP recommended the application of FPIF 
contracts. “Over 80 percent of the Navy’s shipbuilding contracts awarded over the past 10 
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years were fixed-price incentive (FPI)” (Mackin, 2017a, p. 1). The intention of leveraging 
FPIF contracts is to encourage better cost and schedule performance from the contractor. 
Incentive type contracts are appropriate when there is a “desire or need to provide a 
contractor/seller with additional motivation to attain specific acquisition objectives that 
would be unlikely to be obtained without the incentives” (National Contract Management 
Association, 2019, p. 132). However, FPIF contracts should only be implemented when 
requirements are stable and technologies are mature. 
According to GAO, the Navy had not “invested significantly in research and 
development to incorporate leading edge technologies into current carriers” (Francis, 2007, 
p. 1). Although the Navy had not invested in leading edge technologies, the Gerald R. Ford 
class of aircraft carriers were designed to include several advanced technologies. The Navy 
identified 16 critical technologies that CVN-78 depended on to meet development and 
production. The 16 critical technologies listed by GAO are referenced in Table 4. 
Table 6. 16 Critical Technologies and Capabilities. Source: Francis (2007). 
 
Table 4. Navy Faces Challenges Constructing the Aircraft Carrier Gerald R. Ford within Budget.  
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The Navy mitigated the risk of these technologies except for EMALS, AAG, and 
dual band radar (Francis, 2007). These pivotal technologies possessed little margin for 
error because “the lateness of these systems would lead to more labor costs due to the 
potential of inefficient work-around and schedule delays” (Francis, 2007, p. 2). To subside 
the small margin of error for the lateness of high risk technologies, the Navy should have 
continued to mature these technologies in a separate effort while the ship build was 
modular. Additionally, the Navy should have instituted an open architecture to incorporate 
these technologies once they became mature. By applying this classic incremental 
development framework for shipbuilding, it would have been easier to manage risk because 
immature technologies would have been identified and handled during its iteration process. 
Successful delivery of the CVN-78 includes being on schedule, fully mature, and 
operational (Francis, 2007). Considering the risk of deploying immature technologies with 
EMALS, AAG, and the dual band radar, a CPIF contract was selected for the portfolio of 
CVN-78. Assessing affordability and requirements assessment, a CPIF contract was an 
appropriate choice regarding contract type considering the risk of the acquisition profile. 
With the lack of investment on research and development, the significance of releasing 
mature technologies, and stable requirements, the government needed to inherit more risk 
due to the high amount of uncertainty with the weapons systems. With a high degree of 
uncertainty on immature technologies, speculative labor hours, and unstable requirements, 
selecting a cost reimbursement type contract aligned with policy. Additionally, the contract 
portfolio for CVN-78 desired to implement cost incentives to motivate the seller to manage 
costs effectively for major systems development. On the other hand, the acquisition of 
CVN-79 used a different approach during contract type selection. 
Possessing the same design requirements as the lead ship, CVN-79 still sought to 
acquire the same new technologies as CVN-78. Implementing lessons learned from the 
schedule slippage and cost overruns experienced by CVN-78, CVN-79 implemented 
efforts to lower costs while meeting technical capabilities. To capitalize on schedule 
flexibility and deliver the ship at a lower cost, the contract type selected for CVN-79 was 
a FPIF. Although the same risk profile existed with unstable designs and immature 
technologies, a different contract type was selected for CVN-79. The government intended 
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to encourage better cost control and performance on schedule delivery, but the same risk 
caused by immature technologies and unstable design existed. FPIF contracts places more 
cost risk on the contractor and should only be used with well-defined requirements. Based 
on the policy detailed in BBP 2.0, a FPIF contract would not align as the appropriate 
selection for mitigating risk. 
For the acquisitions of CVN-78 and CVN-79, selecting the correct contract type 
was pivotal for mitigating risk. However, the selection of contract type alone does not 
indicate causation of the experienced schedule slippage and cost overruns. Annotating 
differences in contract type for CVN-78 and CVN-79, CVN-78 utilized a CPIF type 
contract while CVN-79 applied a FPIF type contract. In this case, the use of a cost type 
contract is recommended because of the significant risk of acquiring immature 
technologies. FPIF contracts should be implemented when requirements are stable and 
technologies are mature. Although FPIF contracts were heavily incentivized by BBP and 
other initiatives, a cost type contract is recommended to absorb cost from the significant 
risk. This analysis has addressed the four research questions proposed in the introduction 
of thesis, summarized our research, and provided recommendations for future MDAPs in 
the conclusion and recommendations below. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. ANSWERS TO FOUR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What were the advantages and disadvantages in terms of contract 
type selection used in the acquisition of CVN-78 versus CVN-79? 
The acquisition strategies, in regard to contract type, for both CVN-78 and CVN-
79 had many documented similarities during production. Both ships had construction 
preparation contracts, which were awarded as hybrid cost type contracts, CPFF/CPIF/
CPAF for CVN-78 and CPFF/CPIF for CVN-79. The major subcomponents, EMALS and 
AAG, which were acquired outside of the main contract for the carrier, utilized a FFP 
contract in both acquisitions. The major difference between the acquisitions of CVN-78 
and CVN-79 was during the detail design & construction contracts, which would ultimately 
delivery the Ford-class carrier, and was awarded as a hybrid cost type contract for CVN-
78, CPIF, CPAF, and CPFF. However, the detail design and construction contract was 
awarded as a FPIF contract on CVN-79. The selection of contract type should depend 
strictly on the situation of the acquisition, depending on how stable the design is and reflect 
the risk of the unknown variables. Selection of contract type determines “how cost and/or 
performance risk is allocated between the parties” (National Contract Management 
Association, 2019, p. 129). Therefore, advantages and disadvantages of each contract type 
are dictated by the elements of risk each acquisition portfolio possesses. 
Generally, cost type contracts shift significant financial risk on the government. 
The contractor will typically have a cost ceiling and is able to incur allocable costs to the 
contract while charging the government for costs incurred. Once the cost ceiling is met, the 
contractor will typically not have an obligation to continue the effort, unless more funding 
is obligated. Under a cost contract or a CPFF contract, the contractor has no incentive to 
control costs, other than competition. As a means for the government to mitigate the risk 
of absorbing the costs in excess of the contract’s estimate at complete, they can utilize cost 
incentives through a CPIF contract where individual incentive elements are written into the 
contract. CPIF contracts are advantageous as they provide the contractor an opportunity to 
“earn more profit/fee by reducing cost, exceeding the performance objectives or achieving 
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the desired schedule” (Memo, 2016, p. 16). As a result of issuing these incentives, the 
government is then able to align these incentives with their requirements. However, the 
disadvantages of a CPIF contract include the demands and expertise for properly 
structuring the contract to ensure the contractor stays motivated. Therefore, the government 
must be the subject matter experts in aligning contract requirements with incentivizes to 
generate the contractor’s best performance. Although there is a “strong correlation between 
the use of incentive contracts and better performance outcomes” (Grady, 2016, p. 8), poorly 
structured incentive contracts increase cost risk on the government. 
In the case of the acquisition of CVN-78, immature technologies and ill-defined 
requirements exemplified the significant risk for the acquisition portfolio. As a result of 
these immature technologies and poorly defined requirements, the program experienced 
significant risk for the development, performance, and cost estimation. Thus, fixed price 
contracts are not appropriate when development risk exists. Due to the high levels of 
program risk with immature technologies and uncertainties, a cost type contract was 
advantageous to receiving the desired capabilities. Although cost type contracts place more 
cost risk on the government, the contractors need an opportunity to “reduce cycle times, 
maintain schedule, and maximize efficiency” (Grady, 2016, p. 19) given the immature 
technologies surrounding the acquisition portfolio. In order to promote these 
characteristics, issuing a cost type contract with the subject risk profile is advantageous to 
the government. 
On the other hand, the acquisition profile of CVN-79 included the selection of a 
FPIF contract type. Generally, the benefits of issuing a FPIF type contract are consistent 
with a CPIF type contract. Incentive type contracts are advantageous because they allow 
the government to structure a contract that aligns their requirements and incentivizes the 
contractor to control costs in order to earn more profit. Additionally, FPIF contracts 
typically cost less because they are implemented with lower-risk requirements and 
solicitations (Grady, 2016). Conversely, FPIF contracts are not suitable in acquisition 
situations where “technical uncertainty exists because there is also a great likelihood of 
cost uncertainty” (Grady, 2016, p. 18). Thus, FPIF contracts should only be implemented 
when requirements are stable and technologies are mature. In the case of CVN-79, the 
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acquisition portfolio of encapsulated significant production risks, stemming from its 
immature technologies. For that reason, selecting an FPIF contract based on the 
performance risk profile was not advantageous to the government’s goal of receiving the 
intended capabilities. 
The utilization of FFP contracts for EMALS and AAG would have been a 
successful means of shifting risk of cost growth from the government to the contractor, 
however the benefit would have only been recognized if the cost type development 
contracts were inactive. FFP contracts typically shift all cost risk to the contractor, creating 
a situation where the price to the government and the technologies received does not 
fluctuate from the initial estimate. FFP contracts benefit contractors when costs are able to 
be controlled and reduced, but decrease the contractor’s profit when the contract 
experiences cost growth. In the case of EMALS and AAG, the cost to address performance 
issues resulting from the immature technology were predominantly absorbed by the 
development cost type contract which the government ultimately paid for. For acquisitions 
with stable designs, a FFP contract is a great tool, however the contract type did not have 
its intended effect in this case and should not have been used while the cost type 
development contract was active. 
When deciding upon contract type based on performance and development risk, the 
areas to consider include “stability and clarity in the specifications, type and complexity of 
item or service being procured, maturity of technology, prior experience in providing 
required supplies or servicers, contractor technical capability, and extent and nature of 
proposed subcontracts” (Grady, 2016, p. 5). The major difference between the acquisitions 
of CVN-78 and CVN-79 was during the detail design & construction contracts, which 
would ultimately delivery the Ford-class carrier. CVN-78 was awarded as a hybrid cost 
type contract; CPIF, CPAF, and CPFF. On the contrary, CVN-79 was awarded a FPIF type 
contract for detail design and construction. Since the contract specifications lacked clarity 
and technology was immature, the most advantageous contract type for the acquisition of 
CVN-78 and CVN-79 includes a cost type contract. 
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2. What policies or initiatives shaped the decision to choose the contract 
types during the acquisitions of CVN-78 and CVN-79? Was the intent 
of the initiatives ultimately successful during the acquisition? 
According to GAO, the “DOD has taken steps to improve its use of incentive 
contracts-often beyond what is required by the FAR- by revising the DFARS, instituting 
its Better Buying Power initiative, and developing new guidance and training courses” 
(DiNapoli, 2017, p. 10). Through a myriad of training courses, the DOD encouraged 
acquisition professionals to utilize incentive type contracts. Additionally, BBP literature 
highly encouraged the use of incentive contracts for contracting personnel. With highly 
reputable acquisition leaders and memoranda encouraging the use of incentive contracts, 
individuals in charge of defense acquisition programs were easily influenced. The DOD 
revised the FAR and DFARS to mirror the BBP initiatives, encouraging the selection of 
incentive type contracts. Through these initiatives, the DOD specifically “emphasized the 
use of objective incentives through FPI and CPIF contracts” (DiNapoli, 2017, p. 10). The 
purpose of issuing these initiatives and policies involved incentivizing the contractor to 
control its costs and provide them the opportunity to earn more profit. These initiatives and 
policies accumulated significant influence. Due to the DOD’s focus of applying incentive 
type contracts, “65 of 78 major defense acquisition programs used either FPI or CPIF type 
contracts as of January 2017” (DiNapoli, 2017, p. 13).  
In the case of this study, the definition of success is subjective. In the case of 
encouraging the use and implementation of incentive type contracts, DOD policies and 
initiatives were highly successful. For instance, 83% of MDAPs used incentive type 
contracts for their acquisition portfolios. Thus stimulating success for MDAPs using 
incentive type contracts. However, the influence that incentive type contracts had in 
influencing contractor performance is often misconstrued. According to GAO, the “DOD 
acknowledged that some officials interpreted the first memorandum to mean that FPI 
contracts should be used to the exclusion of other contract types” (DiNapoli, 2017, p.13). 
Due to DOD policies and BBP initiatives prioritizing incentive type contracts, acquisition 
professionals neglected selecting the appropriated contract type based on the subject risk 
profile of their acquisition. Ideally, acquisition and contracting professionals must consider 
the full range of contracts when selecting the appropriate contract type. As a result of the 
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BBP initiatives and DOD policies, incentive type contracts were implemented without the 
full evaluation and documentation of the entire risk portfolio. Therefore, determining 
success is immensely difficult because, although these initiatives and policies influenced 
MDAPs to select incentive type contracts, “incentive type contracts do not always lead to 
better outcomes” (DiNapoli, 2017, p. 33). 
3. How can contract type shape future acquisitions to deliver the 
expected capabilities, on time, and within the planned acquisition 
cost? 
The selection of contract type can influence the success of future acquisitions to 
deliver the expected capabilities, on time and at cost. By assessing the risk profile of a 
given acquisition and selecting the appropriate contract type, the acquisition workforce  
can set up a contract for success. There are many variables beyond contract type  
that effect cost, schedule and performance in a complex acquisition, however selecting an 
effective contract type from the start can help the government receive the benefit they are 
contracting for. 
When the acquisition is acquiring immature technologies with many unknown, the 
government should fully understand the risk they are taking on. It does not serve the 
government’s end goals by moving to either a FPIF or FFP contract too early as significant 
cost growth will be absorbed by the government in some form. By moving to a FPIF or 
FFP contract too early, the government creates administrative challenges by having to 
maintain active cost type development contracts alongside the FPIF or FFP so that the 
design changes can be implemented before production. Had the government assessed the 
high risk of the acquisition and kept all contracts cost type, then this administrative burden 
would have been reduced and the program office would have more resources to focus on 
the design challenges. 
Incentives can be a beneficial tool in controlling contractor behavior, but its ability 
to shape outcomes from a new technology is limited. Without an incentive on a cost type 
contract, contractors do not have enough stake in the acquisition to innovate during the 
contract’s life in order to reduce costs. Properly applying incentives can encourage a 
contractor to provide the intended benefit for less than the estimated price. However, it is 
46 
unrealistic to believe incentives can mitigate the risk associated with an unproven 
technology. This is the case with many MDAPs in recent years and is certainly the 
experience of CVN-78 and CVN-79. The amount of unknown variables was too significant 
to assume the incentive would be effective in controlling cost growth.  
The government must be realistic when choosing a contract type. By analyzing the 
specific risk of a specific acquisition, the government can prepare a contract type that aligns 
with the risk profile. If the risk is high, then the business case should reflect that risk and 
focus on the derived benefit from pursuing this new technology. When utilizing incentive 
payments, the incentives should only be released to the contractor if the original goals were 
met. Incentives should not be awarded to cover additional costs incurred by the contractor 
that were not in the original estimate. Once technologies are mature enough that the risk 
profile supports a FPIF or FFP contract, then the fixed price award should be used without 
an active development contract. Without an active development contract, the risk of cost 
overruns is the burden of the contractor and not the government. When the government 
decides to move to a FPIF or FFP contract, then the development contracts should be 
completed or near completion so that they are not utilize when the acquisition faces 
turbulence. By choosing the correct contracting vehicle, the government can influence the 
contractor by managing the costs, schedule and quality of an acquisition. 
4. How can future DOD acquisition strategy be changed to better guide 
acquisition professionals on how to choose contract type when 
acquiring new/immature technologies? 
Current DOD acquisition strategy has a focus on making decisions based on the 
specific situation in order to influence the outcome. However, there is an enormous amount 
of cultural and recency bias to overcome in the awarding of certain contract types for 
certain technologies within the DOD. The Navy has historically used FPIF contracts for 
shipbuilding and when recent policy initiatives, such as the BBP, aligned with the Navy’s 
preferred practice, contracting professionals were likely empowered to continue to make 
the same decisions and repeat the same outcomes. The DOD must promote the ideas 
documented by the GAO as new policy initiatives consistently in order to combat the 
cultural bias of the acquisition team to award the same way as the previous MDAP. Future 
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DOD acquisition strategies must highlight and champion the idea of treating each 
acquisition as an individual action, based on its specific risk profile and not based on broad 
guidance. 
The BBP initiatives discussed when to use incentive contracts, but the message was 
heavily focused on the benefits from using incentive contracts. In future DOD policy 
initiatives, the DOD needs to emphasize when the use specific contract types. By 
promoting the most valuable situations rather than the benefit received, more acquisition 
teams will have the knowledge to select a contract type for their specific scenario. If an 
acquisition team should determine that incentives are a viable option, then policy should 
aid the acquisition team by adequately highlighting the critical importance of the 
incentivized elements, in include samples and reference material for the detailed 
justification and documentation. By empowering the acquisition team to make critical 
decisions based on the facts of their acquisition and not through broad application of 
general policy the DOD can better support using the correct contract type for the future 
acquisition. 
DOD acquisition policy does not currently address the use of concurrent 
development and production contracts. Future DOD acquisition policy needs to opine on 
how the acquisition team should handle such a situation. The policy would prefer for 
development to be fully complete before production begins, but the Navy’s shipbuilding 
track record shows that concurrent development and production is likely a reality as rapid 
development becomes more heavily relied upon. DOD acquisition strategy should address 
the impacts of running concurrent development and production to guide the acquisition 
team on their selection of contract type. By providing helping the acquisition team 
understand how to operate a portfolio of contracts with different contract type, and how 
the effectiveness of contract type changes as the portfolio grows will encourage the 
acquisition team to make reasonable and justifiable decisions.  
B. SUMMARY  
We analyze the acquisitions of both CVN-78 and CVN-79 and examine the impact 
of each carrier’s selected contract type. The Navy continues to pay a price premium for 
48 
advanced warships, which results in the ships being returned to the shipyard for retrofitting 
and repair. Experiencing cost overruns and schedule slippages, the Navy continues to fail 
at achieving “efficiency and productivity in defense spending by delivering warfighting 
capabilities needed with money available” (Kendall, 2012). Therefore, the purpose of this 
JAP was to determine whether the selection of contract type impacted cost and time 
overruns experienced by the Ford-aircraft carriers. Besides determining whether contract 
type selection impacted cost and time overruns, another pivotal piece to this research 
includes identifying the contracting strategies utilized for these acquisitions whether the 
Navy can accumulate lessons learned from the history of these acquisitions. 
Replacing the Nimitz class, the design of CVN-78 consists of providing an 
increased capability to the fleet with cutting-edge technology. However, the cutting-edge 
technology designed had yet to be tested and evaluated. Due to these immature 
technologies, technical risk from AAG, EMALS, and AWE permeated the acquisition 
portfolio. Persistent immature technologies caused severe cost, schedule, and performance 
overruns, which ended up delaying the delivery of CVN-78. Implementing lessons learned 
from CVN-78, CVN-79’s characteristics consisted of improved shipyard fabrications and 
assembly process. Although CVN-79 implemented lessons learned, the acquisition of 
CVN-79 consisted of high risk for future cost growth. The major difference between the 
acquisitions of CVN-78 and CVN-79 was during the detail design and construction 
contracts. CVN-78 was awarded as a hybrid cost type contract for CVN-78; CPIF, CPAF, 
and CPFF. While on the contrary, the detail design and construction for CVN-79 was 
awarded as a FPIF contract. 
Being heavily incentivized by BBP, FPIF contracts require the government to know 
exactly what it needs and is most productive at managing risk when the requirement’s 
baseline does not change. However, fixed price contracts are not appropriate when 
development risks exists. Fixed priced contracts shall only be selected for development 
when “1) Requirements are stable 2) Technologies are mature 3) The contractor is 
experienced 4) The contractor can absorb overruns 5) The contractor has a business case 
for absorbing any overruns that occur” (Kendall, 2016, p. 3). Maintaining cost and schedule 
baselines when acquiring immature technologies is unreasonable considering the severe 
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amount of risk associated with the Ford-class carriers. Due to the amount of risk associated 
with immature technologies, a cost type contract would be the recommended contract type 
selection. With immense programmatic risk, the only reasonable path forward for the 
acquisition is for the government to absorb the cost through a flexibly priced contract. With 
the lack of investment on research and development, the significance of releasing mature 
technologies, and stable requirements, the government should inherit more risk due to the 
high amount of uncertainty with the weapons systems. Ideally, FPIF contracts should be 
implemented when requirements are stable and technologies are mature. Even with the 
accumulated research, it should be noted that the selection of contract type alone does not 
indicate causation of the experienced schedule slippage and cost overruns experienced by 
CVN-78 and CVN-79. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In order for the U.S. to maintain our dominant position across the globe, we must 
continue to acquire cutting edge technologies that modernize our MDAPs. However, 
modern MDAPs come at a significant price as they will commonly incorporate new 
technologies, often with unproven and new designs. The DOD must identify the critical 
MDAPs and focus on the development before construction. The more refined the 
development of a program is, the less funding that will be needed for redesigns during the 
production and post-delivery phases. The DOD should view each acquisition as a unique 
opportunity to choose the correct acquisition mythologies that best suit the specific need. 
The government must decide if a new technology is critical to the national defense 
strategy. If it is, then the technology should be developed on separate contracts until the 
design is mature enough to be integrated into the intended platform. This may have proven 
impossible for the EMALS and AAG subcomponents as they had considerable influence 
on the entire ship’s design, but had other new technologies been developed as modular, 
then a proven design could be use until a development on the new technology is complete. 
Had the Ford-class carrier been developed as a modular system, then the Navy could have 
decided to delay the integration of a technology such as the AWEs from being installed on 
the lead ship, and wait for the technology to mature. By waiting for a technology to mature 
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before being used in a production contract, the Navy would likely incur most of the costs 
on a flexibly priced contract for development and then would be in their right to support a 
FPIF contract for production. If the Navy utilized a shipbuilding approach, which 
integrated new technologies once the design was functioning and stable, then significant 
savings could have been realized on the first versions of the Ford-class carriers. 
If it is not possible to wait for a technology to mature and a decision on which 
technology to use must be made for the construction of a ship, then the acquisition team 
should utilize a cost type contract. Any shift from a cost type contract to a fixed price 
contract, either FPIF or FFP, is premature if development is ongoing. The fixed priced 
contract will not have their intended effect as costs for redesign will be shifted to the 
development contract. By running concurrent development and production the government 
takes on significant risk that would otherwise shift the contractor under a typical fixed price 
acquisition. 
Incentives can provide a benefit to the government, increasing the contractor’s 
stake in the control of cost growth. However, incentives must be selected judiciously and 
be well documented. The acquisition team must become subject matter experts and choose 
the specific incentive elements carefully to influence contractor behavior. If a contractor 
has not met the entire intent of an incentive, then the incentive should not be paid. Too 
often the government is paying the contractor the full incentive payment, but is not 
receiving the intended outcome. There will continue to be many unknown variables when 
acquiring new technologies, understanding how new information impacts the acquisition 
program baseline and making changes as appropriate will benefit a realistic cost estimation 
throughout the acquisition life cycle.  
There are many factors that can contribute to overruns in cost and schedule and the 
acquisition environment is too complex to identify a single factor as the element that drove 
a cost overrun. However, while reviewing the Navy’s acquisition of MDAPs over the past 
several years, there is consistently a trend of spending more funding to receive a late 
delivery that is less capable than the original design intended. The authors do not claim that 
the correlation between the overruns and is caused by the contract type selected, but there 
are observable correlations that warrant further investigate and discussion. While the 
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authors are unable to directly state that the wrong contract type selection has allowed for 
these overruns, it is possible to consider how a different contract type may have improved 
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